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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmABSTRACT 
This paper shows that the assumed structure of taxation can have dramatic effects on economic 
welfare and the stability of the steady state in a dynamic general-equilibrium model of  optimal fiscal 
policy. Specifically, tax structure refers to the use of  separate versus uniform tax rates on labor and 
capital income, the  level of  taxation of firm dividends (single versus double taxation), and the tax 
treatment of  depreciation. Under each tax  structure, the government selects a balanced-budget fiscal 
policy (consisting of tax rates and the level of public expenditures) which maximizes the welfare of the 
representative household. We find that household welfare is highest under a tax structure that includes 
separate tax  rates  on  labor  and  capital  income,  double  taxation  of  dividends,  and  tax  deductible 
depreciation. Moreover, single taxation of dividends yields an unstable steady state under a structure with 
separate tax rates on labor and capital income and tax deductible depreciation. This instability, which 
is robust to changes in parameter values, can be  removed by implementing various changes to the tax 
structure, such as (1) imposing double taxation of dividends, (2) taxing labor and capital income at the 
same rate,  or (3)  eliminating the depreciation allowance. Of  these three  options, imposing double 
taxation of  dividends yields the highest welfare. 
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This paper shows that the assumed structure of taxation can have dramatic effects on economic 
welfare and the stability of  the steady state in a dynamic general-equilibrium model of  optimal fiscal 
policy. Specifically, tax structure refers to the use of  separate versus uniform tax rates on labor and 
capital income, the level of  taxation of  firm dividends (single versus double taxation), and the tax 
treatment  of  depreciation.  The  framework  for  the  analysis  is  a  deterministic,  infinite-horizon 
representative household model in which the government solves a dynamic version of the Rarnsey (1  927) 
optimal tax problem. Public capital serves as a direct input to the firm's neoclassical production function, 
which exhibits constant returns to scale in all inputs, public and private. As  a result, the firm retains 
positive profits equal to public capital's share of  output. 
Within the constraints defined by  each tax structure, we endogenize the choice of fiscal policy 
by solving for the optimal tax rates and the optimal levels of public consumption and public investment 
that  maximize household utility.  We  consider three distinct aspects of  the tax  structure.  First, we 
examine the effects of  taxing all types of  income at the same rate (a so-called uniform income tax), 
versus a structure that allows for separate tax rates on labor and capital income.'  Second, we postulate 
that profits are initially taxed at the firm level, and study the effects of  allowing the government to tax 
profits a second time  when they  are distributed to households in the form of  dividends. Third, we 
consider the effects of eliminating the tax deductibility of depreciation. The various tax structures are 
compared in terms of  economic welfare (as measured by  steady-state utility), output (as measured by 
steady-state GNP), and the local stability of  the steady state. 
Our primary finding is that household welfare is highest under a tax structure that  includes 
separate tax  rates  on  labor and  capital  income,  double taxation  of  dividends, and  tax  deductible 
depreciation. From the perspective of choosing an optimal fiscal policy, a uniform tax structure imposes 
an additional constraint on the government's decision problem, namely, that the tax rate on labor income 
must be equal to the tax rate on capital income. Because a policy of equal tax rates is available to the 
government under a more general tax structure, but is not chosen, we know that the additional constraint 
is binding and thus results in a lower level of  household utility than in the unconstrained case. From the 
'see Guo and  Lansing (1994) for a more detailed analysis of this  aspect of tax structure in a related model. 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmstandpoint of  economic welfare, double taxation of dividends is superior to single taxation because it 
allows the government to recapture a larger percentage of public capital's share of  output. If a separate 
profits  tax  were  available, the  government would  choose to tax  profits  at  a  rate  of  100 percent. 
Effectively, the tax  on profits  acts like a user fee for productive services of public capital. Double 
taxation improves welfare because it comes closer to the ideal confiscatory rate than does single taxation. 
Furthermore, the additional tax revenue is used to finance public consumption and public investment 
(both of which provide benefits to households), and permits the use of a lower tax rate on labor income. 
Finally, the  depreciation allowance improves household  welfare because it  operates as an  implicit 
subsidy to capital accumulation, and partially offsets the distortion associated with taxing income from 
capital. As we have previously shown in a related paper (see Guo and Lansing [1994]), the welfare cost 
of eliminating the depreciation allowance is quite high, over 2 percent of GNP, a fact which highlights 
the importance of this tax break in encouraging capital formation. 
An additional, rather interesting finding is that single taxation of  dividends yields an unstable 
long-run equilibrium under a structure which includes separate tax rates on labor and capital income and 
tax deductible depreciation. In this case, we find that the Jacobian matrix of the linearized dynamical 
system (in the neighborhood of the steady state) displays too many explosive eigenvalues. This indicates 
that the long-run equilibrium cannot be characterized by  a stable set of stationary policy rules. This 
instability, which is robust to changes in parameter values, can be removed by implementing various 
changes to the tax structure, such as (1) imposing double taxation of  dividends, (2) taxing labor and 
\ 
capital income at the same rate, or (3) eliminating the depreciation allowance. Of these three options, 
imposing double taxation of dividends yields the highest level of household welfare. 
Our results highlight the importance of taking into account both the structure of the tax system 
and the level of tax rates in considering policies designed to improve welfare or stabilize the economy. 
Moreover, our results suggest a possible justification for some observed features of the U.S. tax system, 
such as the coexistence of the corporate income tax with the practice of  subjecting dividends to the 
personal income tax. Some previous related research includes Arrow and Kurz (1970), who employ an 
optimal growth model with public capital to discuss the theoretical possibility of  multiple steady states 
exhibiting different stability properties. Cooley and Hansen (1992) evaluate the welfare effects of various 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmcombinations of  exogenous taxes in  a neoclassical monetary economy. Finally, Pecorino (1993) and 
Stokey and Rebelo (1993) study the effects of tax structure on economic growth in endogenous growth 
models with human capital. 
The remainder of  this paper is organized in the following manner:  Sections 2 and 3 describe 
the model and the methods we use to compute the steady state and determine the stability of  the long- 
run stationary equilibrium. The choice of parameter values is discussed in section 4.  Section 5 presents 
quantitative welfare comparis  ons based on steady-state analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  The Model 
The model economy consists of  many identical, infinitely lived households, identical private 
firms, and the government. The government finances expenditures on public consumption goods and 
public investment goods by levying distortionary taxes on households and firms. AU  goods (public and 
private) are produced using a privately owned, Cobb-Douglas technology that exhibits constant returns 
to  scale in the  three productive inputs: labor, private capital, and  public capital. The form of  the 
technology implies that private firms earn an economic profit equal to the difference between the value 
of output and payments to private factor inputs. The purpose of introducing profits is to obtain a positive 
optimal tax  rate on  capital, consistent with U.S.  observations.'  As  owners of  the firms, households 
receive net profits in the form of dividends, but consider them to be outside their control, similar to 
wages and interest rates. We assume that the government can distinguish between labor and capital 
income, but  cannot  distinguish between the different categories of  capital income, such as profits, 
dividends, and capital rental income. Therefore, our model includes only two types of distortionary taxes: 
a labor tax and a capital tax. 
2.1  The Household's Problem 
Households maximize a discounted stream of  within-period utility functions over consumption 
and leisure, subject to a sequence of budget constraints. The decision problem can be summarized as 
2~ones,  Manuelli,  and  Rossi  (1993) show  that  the  existence of profits  and  a restriction on  the  menu  of  available  tax 
instruments (the absence of a separate profits tax) is one method of obtaining a positive optimal tax rate on capital in the steady 
state. Without profits, the optimal steady-state tax  on capital is zero (see Judd  [I9851 and Chamley [1986]). 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm- 
max  EDf {lnc, -Ah, + Blng,)  O<D <1,  A, B20 
c,.h,.k,*, t-0 
subject to 
In the above equations, J3 is  the constant household discount factor and ct represents private 
consumption goods. Households are endowed with one unit of time each period and work ht hours during 
period t. Household preferences also include a separable term representing the utility provided by public 
consumption goods g,. Examples of  public consumption goods that might affect household utility are 
national defense, police protection, and  government provision of  food  and housing  during natural 
disasters. Public goods are assumed to be noncongestable and free of  specific user charges. 
Households maximize the utility function in (1) over c,  and h,, but view g, as outside their 
control. The form of  the within-period utility function has been chosen for tractability. The fact that 
utility is linear in hours worked reflects the "indivisible labor" formulation, as described by Rogerson 
(1988) and Hansen (1985). The separability in c, and g, implies that public consumption does not affect 
the  marginal  utility  of  private  consumption,  a  specification  supported by  parameter  estimates in 
McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1993). We introduce no uncertainty into this model because our 
analysis focuses  on  steady-state welfare  comparisons  and  the  stability properties  of  a  linearized 
dynamical system that exhibits the property of certainty equivalence. 
Equation  (2) represents the period budget constraint of  the household. The terms xt and  k, 
represent  gross private  investment and private  capital, respectively.  Households derive  income by 
supplying labor and capital services to firms at rental rates w,  and r, and pay taxes on labor and capital 
income at rates 7,  and T,,  respectively. An  additional source of  income is the firms'  net profits .ft,, 
which are distributed to households as dividends and are taxed at the same rate as capital rental income 
rt  kt .  The term $7,  6kt represents the depreciation allowance, where the parameter $ can be set to either 
1 or 0, depending on whether this tax break is included as part of the tax structure. Equation (3) is the 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmlaw of  motion for private capital, given a constant rate of  depreciation 6.  Households view tax rates, 
wages, interest rates, and dividends as determined outside their control. 
2.2  Household Optimality 
The  Lagrangian for the household's problem is defined as 
The household first-order conditions with respect to the indicated variables and the associated 
transversality conditions (TVC) are 
TVC:  lim Ptktkt+,  = 0. 
t +- 
The government's problem is solved by  finding the set of welfare-maximizing allocations ct ,  ht 
and kt+,,  such that the household's first-order conditions (5) and budget constraint (2) are satisfied. Given 
these optimal allocations, the government uses the household equilibrium conditions to recover the 
appropriate tax rates z,  and z,  that will support these allocations in a decentralized e~onomy.~ 
3~ee  Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1993) for a more complete discussion of this equilibrium concept. 
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Output (y,)  is  produced by  identical private firms which seek to maximize  after-tax profit, 
subject to a technology that exhibits constant returns to scale in the three productive inputs, h,, k,  and 
k,,,  where kGt is the stock of  public capital. The fm's profits are taxed at the rate 7,.  The firm's 
decision problem can be summarized as follows: 
subject to 
0  0  0, 
Yt = kt  ' hz  kct  0<Oi<l,  Ol+O2+e3 = 1. 
In (6), the parameter v controls the level of taxation of firm dividends. When v  = 2, dividends 
are taxed twice; once at the firm level and again at the household level. When y=  1, dividends are taxed 
only once, at the household level. This  formulation of  double taxation reflects the idea that only a 
portion of the total income from capital is taxed twice. Capital rental income (rt  kt ) is taxed only once, 
at the rate z,,  regardless of the value of y.  The firm's first-order conditions are4 
J't  wt  = O,,. 
h  t 
The firm's  after-tax profits, distributed to households in the form of dividends, are 
2.4  The Government's Problem 
The government chooses  an  optimal program  of  taxes  and public expenditures in  order to 
maximize the discounted utility of the household. This is a dynamic version of the Ramsey (1927) 
optimal tax problem, involving a Stackelberg game between the government and households. To avoid 
4  There is no need to distinguish between'variables under the household's  control and variables representing  "per capita" 
quantities here, as must be done when solving directly for a decentralized  equilibrium. As pointed out by  Lucas and Stokey 
(1983), the  solution  to  the  government's  (centralized)  decision  problem  yields  a  set of  policies  which  dictate  household 
equilibrium allocations. These allocations determine the equilibrium prices r, and w,. Thus, prices are not outside the control of 
the government, which differs in this respect from an individual household. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmtime-consistency problems, we assume that the government can commit to a set of  state-contingent, 
stationary policy rules announced at time zero. Also, to make the problem interesting, we rule out any 
time-zero levies on private-sector assets that might be used to finance all future expenditures. In addition, 
we assume that the government adheres to a period-by-period balanced-budget  constraint.'  With these 
assumptions, the government's problem is 
subject to 
(i)  household first-order conditions and budget constraint, 
(ii)  firm  profit maximization conditions, 
-  (vi)  z,,  - z,,  = z,  (for the uniform tax structure) . 
Constraints (i) and (ii) summarize rational maximizing behavior on the part of private agents and 
constitute "implementability" constraints imposed on the government's choice of policy. Constraint (iii) 
is the government budget constraint, where the last term on the right-hand side reflects the structure of 
dividend taxation.  Constraint (iv) is  the law of  motion for public  capital,  given a constant rate  of 
depreciation 6,  and gross public  investment x,.  Constraint (vi) is  a transversality condition on the 
accumulation of public capital, where It;,  is the marginal utility of public consumption g,  .  Finally, (vi) 
specifies the  constraint associated  with the uniform income tax.  The vector  !P,=  (x,,  ,  g,  ,  z,,  z,  j 
summarizes government policy at time t. The summation of the household budget constraint (2) and the 
government budget constraint ( iii) yields the following resource constraint for the economy: 
'~ddin~  government debt  to  the model introduces  complications that  we wish  to  avoid here. Specifically, the  perfect 
foresight equilibrium for a model with debt and capital imposes an  arbitrage condition on the returns from govemment bonds 
and private capital. The steady-state level of debt is thus indeterminate (see Chamley [1985]). Furthermore, government debt 
introduces another state variable which increases the dimensionality of the dynamical system we intend to analyze. 
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equations, equation (1  1) will  be used in place of (iii) in solving the government's problem. 
3.  Solution of the Model 
To facilitate computation of  the long-run stationary equilibrium, the  government's  problem 
specified in (10) is rewritten as the following infinite-horizon sequence problem: 
subject to  -  -, 
(for the uniform 
- 
w,h,-L  s  J=O  tax  structure only) 
To obtain the formulation in (12), we first substitute the household first-order conditions shown 
in (5) into the household budget constraint (2), the resource constraint (1  I), and the household utility 
function to eliminate 7, ,  T, , and c, . The resource constraint (1  1) is then used to substitute out g, . 
Following the solution method of Kydland and Prescott (1980), we define the household lagged-shadow 
price h.,  to be a "pseudo-state variable" for our analysis. Including h,,  in the state vector provides a 
link to the past by which the policymaker at time t considers the fact that household decisions in earlier 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmperiods depend  on current policy.  This is the mechanism by  which the commitment assumption is 
incorporated into the  government's  decision problem  In (12), the  vector  of  state variables for the 
government's problem in period t is st =(kt,  kG,  ,  h .,)  and the government's decision variables are 4+,  , 
k, ,+,  ,  I,,  and h,. The first constraint in (12) is the household budget equation after substituting in the 
household first-order conditions. The next constraint imposes the condition of equal tax rates on labor 
and  capital income for the  uniform tax  structure. The remaining constraints define the  production 
technology and the factor prices r, and w,. 
The sequence problem in (12) applies for all t > 0. The problem at t =  0 must be  considered 
separately, as shown by Kydland and Prescott (1980), Lucas and Stokey (1983), and Chamley (1986). 
At  t= 0, the stock of private capital is fixed. Optimal fiscal policy thus implies a high initial tax  on 
capital to take full advantage of  this nondistortionary source of  revenue. We assume that this form of 
lump-sum taxation is insufficient to finance the entire stream of  future expenditures. The analysis here 
will focus on long-run equilibrium, i.e., when t approaches infinity. Since (12) can be written in the form 
of  a  recursive  dynamic  programming  problem  (see  Kydland  and  Prescott  [I9801 and  Guo  and 
Lansing [1994]), we confine our attention to stationary equilibria. We do not solve the t =  0 problem or 
compute the transition path to the steady state. 
Given (l2), we obtain first-order conditions with respect to  kt+, ,  kG ,,  ,  I,,  h, ,  A,, ,  and, for the 
uniform tax structure, h, ,  where A,,  and h, are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the first two 
constraints (the remaining constraints having been eliminated by  substitution). To compute the steady 
state, all time subscripts are dropped from the first-order conditions to form a system of nonlinear 
equations in the indicated variables. The system is then solved using a nonlinear equation s01ver.~ 
Under the  more  general tax structure (z,#z,),  the  first-order conditions from (12) can be 
reduced to a system of three second-order, nonlinear difference equations in 4,  k,,  ,  and &-,. In this case, 
the first-order condition for h, is used to eliminate A,, from the dynamical system, and the (linearized) 
first-order condition for A,, is used to eliminate h, .  Similar operations are performed for the uniform tax 
structure (z,  =  z,),  except that the dynamics for the state variable &-, are now only first order, and A,, 
6~he  NLSYS routine in GAUSS  version 3.1.4 was used. 
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approximation of the dynamical system under each tax structure. By implementing a transformation of 
variables zt =  kt+, ,  ut =  k,  ,+,  ,  and vt =  h, ,  the system can be rewritten as a set of  six first-order linear 
difference equations. The difference equations take the following form, where hat (^) variables denote 
deviations from steady-state values in logarithms, and J is  the 6x6 Jacobian matrix for the linearized 
dynamical system: 
for the more general tax structure, and 
for the uniform  tax structure. 
Because the government's problem for t>O is recursive, the solutions to the linear systems 
shown in (13) and (14) consist of  a set of stationary policy rules for k,+, ,  k,  ,  and ht  which can be 
expressed as log-linear functions of the state variables k,, kct, and h  The stability of the stationary 
equilibrium is determined by comparing the number of eigenvalues of J located inside the unit circle 
to the number of initial conditions (see Farmer [1993]). For this problem, the three predetermined state 
variables constitute the three initial conditions. When J has exactly three eigenvalues inside the unit 
7~n  this case, the first-order condition for h, is used to eliminate h,,  the (linearized) first-order condition for A,, is used to 
eliminate h,, and the first-order condition for h, is used to eliminate I,+,.  Thus, A,, remains in the dynamical system. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmcircle, the linearized dynarnical system possesses a unique set of stable, stationary policy rules in terms 
of  k, ,  k,,  ,  and h ,,.'  When J has less than three eigenvalues inside the unit circle, the system explodes. 
In this case, the long-run equilibrium cannot be characterized by  a stable set of stationary policy rules, 
and we label the system as "unstable." 
4.  Calibration of the Model 
To obtain quantitative results from the model, as many  parameters as  possible are assigned 
values  in  advance  on  the  basis  of  empirically  observed  features  of  postwar  U.S.  data.  Table  1 
summarizes the choice of  parameter values and is followed by  a brief explanation of  how they  were 
selected. The time period in the model is taken to be one year. This is consistent with the frequency of 
most government fiscal decisions. Experiments with a quarterly time period (P =  0.99, 6 = 0.02, and 
6,  =  0.01) produced qualitatively similar results. 
Table 1:  Parameter Set 
Agent  Parameters and Values 
Households  = 0.962  A = 2.60  B = 0.28 
8, = 0.30 
Firms  8, = 0.60  6  = 0.08 
8,  = 0.10 
Government  4 = {1,0)  W = {2, 1)  6,  = 0.04 
The discount factor P implies an annual rate of  time preference of  4 percent. The parameter A 
in the household utility function is chosen such that the fraction of  time spent working is close to 0.3 
at the steady-state. The  value of  B is chosen to yield  a steady-state value of  gIGNP  near 0.17,  the 
average ratio for the U.S. economy from 1947 to 1992.9 The selected values of  8, and  8,  are in the 
range of  the estimated shares of  GNP received by private capital and labor in the U.S. economy (see 
Christian0 [1988]). The output elasticity of public capital, 03,  is chosen to yield a steady-state ratio of 
'~t  t=O, the government's problem cannot be represented by (12),  so our  approach only allows us to characterize the 
stability of the long-run stationary equilibrium. 
9~n  computing this average, public consumption was estimated by subtracting public investment from an annualized series 
for government  purchases of goods and services (GGEQ  from Citibase). This was done to reduce double counting, since the series 
does not distinguish between government consumption and investment goods. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmpublic investment to GNP (x,/GNP)  near 0.05, based on the U.S.  average from 1947 to  1992. The 
private capital depreciation rate 6 is consistent with values commonly used in the real business-cycle 
literature. The public capital depreciation rate, 6,  ,  was estimatedby regressing the linear law of motion 
on annual data for k,,  and x,,  (see Lansing [1994]). 
5.  Steady-State Welfare and Stability 
Based on our choice of parameter values, tables 2a and 2b show the steady-state values of  key 
model variables for each of the various tax structures. In terms of  maximizing steady-state utility and 
output, the "optimum" tax  structure can be  found in the first column of table 2a.  This tax structure 
includes double taxation of dividends, tax deductible depreciation, and separate tax rates on labor and 
capital income. A few general observations about the effects of changes to the tax structure can be made. 
First, holding other aspects of the tax structure constant, the imposition of double taxation of dividends 
always causes steady-state utility  and output to increase.  Second, any tax  structure that includes a 
depreciation allowance yields higher levels of steady-state utility and output than any structure without 
this tax break. Third, a uniform income tax does almost as well as a structure with separate tax rates on 
labor and capital income. This last observation is consistent with the results of Guo and Lansing (1994), 
who employ a model in which profits are introduced by way of monopolistic competition rather than 
by way of productive public capital. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 2a:  Steady-State Comparison of  Tax Structures 
Double Taxation of  Dividends (y  = 2) 
With Depreciation Allowance ($ = 1)  No Depreciation Allowance ($ = 0) 
Variable  %A  + Tk  zh=zk=z  %A  + Tk  zh=zk=z 
Utility  -2.767 
GNP = y  0.464 
Tax Rates 
Table 2b:  Steady-State Comparison of  Tax Structures 
Single Taxation of  Dividends (y  = 1) 
With Depreciation Allowance ($ = 1)  No Depreciation Allowance ($ = 0) 
Variable  %A  + zk  'q,=zk=z  Th + Tk  zh=zk=z 
Utility  -2.792  -2.793  -2.816  -2.829 
GNP = y  0.442  0.439  0.423  0.421  ...............................................  - ..............................................  - ..............................................  - ..............................................  - ............................................... 
c  0.268  0.264  0.258  0.265 
Tax Rates 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 3 summarizes the welfare and output losses for each of  the various tax structures, where 
the optimum tax structure noted above is used as the baseline for comparison. These figures show that 
tax structure can have dramatic effects on economic welfare and output, even when the government does 
its best to maximize the well-being of  the household. Starting from the optimum tax structure, a change 
from double taxation of dividends to single taxation reduces household welfare by  over 1.5 percent of 
GNP, which translates to an annual loss of  $390 per person in 1993."  Double taxation of dividends is 
superior to single taxation because it allows the government to recapture a larger percentage of public 
capital's share of  output. If a separate profits tax were available, the government would choose to tax 
profits at a rate of  100 percent (see Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi [1993]). Effectively, the tax on profits 
acts like a user fee for the productive services of  public capital. Double taxation is welfare improving 
because it comes  closer to the ideal confiscatory  rate  than does  single taxation. Furthermore, the 
additional tax revenue is used to finance public consumption and public investment, and permits the use 
of  a lower tax rate on labor income. 
Table 3 also shows that, starting from the optimum tax structure, eliminating the depreciation 
allowance will reduce household welfare by  over 2 percent of  GNP. (This change corresponds to a 
movement across the first row of table 3a to end up in the third column of  the table.) Eliminating the 
depreciation allowance reduces household welfare because it operates as an implicit subsidy to capital 
accumulation and partially offsets the distortion associated with taxing income from capital. This occurs 
even  though  marginal  tax  rates  on  capital income  are  lower  in  a  structure  with  no  depreciation 
allowance. Because the govemment wishes to tax profits as much as possible, a high tax rate on capital 
combined with a full depreciation allowance is superior to a low tax rate on capital combined with no 
depreciation allowance."  It is interesting to compare our finding that the depreciation allowance has a 
large welfare effect to that of Pecorino (1993), who finds that the tax deductibility of depreciation has 
no effect on the maximum steady-state growth rate in an endogenous growth model. 
'O~his  number is based on a nominal GNP  of $6,510 billion and total U.S.  population of 258.2 million in 1993. 
"when  profits  are  zero  (1-8, -8,=0) and  the government can tax labor  and  capital income separately, eliminating the 
depreciation allowance has no effect whatsoever on the steady-state allocations. This can be seen from the government's problem 
in (12) for the generalized tax  structure (z,#z,);  note that the depreciation allowance parameter I$  only appears in  the profit 
term of the (transformed) household budget constraint. 
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determined by the method described in section 3. In the first column of  table 3b, we see that the steady 
state is unstable under a structure with single taxation of  dividends, tax deductible depreciation, and 
separate tax rates  on  labor and  capital income.  In  this case, the Jacobian matrix of  the linearized 
dynarnical system displays too many explosive eigenvalues (there are four eigenvalues located outside 
the unit circle and only two inside). This indicates that the solution to the (approximate version of) the 
government's  problem (12) cannot be  characterized by  a stable set of  stationary policy  rules.  Our 
experiments indicate that this instability is robust to changes in the following parameters: P, A, B, 8,, 
8,.  8,.  6, and 6,.  However, table 4 shows that the instability can be removed by implementing various 
changes to the tax structure, such as (1) imposing double taxation of  dividends, (2) imposing a uniform 
income tax, or (3) eliminating the depreciation allowance. Of these three options, only one, imposing 
double  taxation  of  dividends,  causes  household  welfare  to  increase.  Schematically,  this  option 
corresponds to a movement from the first column of table 3b, directly upward, to the first column of 
table 3a, yielding the optimum tax structure noted earlier. 
The high dimensionality of the dynamical system makes it difficult to pinpoint the intuition for 
the unstable tax structure. However, it appears that the instability is due in some way to the presence 
of public capital as an endogenous state variable. With productive public capital, the dynamical system 
is characterized by  a 6x6 Jacobian matrix.  We  have experimented with  an otherwise similar model 
without public capital (see Guo and Lansing [1994]), which is described by a 4x4 Jacobian matrix, and 
found no unstable tax structures. We have also experimented with the use of noninteger values for the 
tax structure parameters v and  $.  Starting from the unstable tax  structure, we  found that values  of 
v2 1.19 or  $10.11  remove the instability. Thus, a stable tax structure can be  obtained by  taxing 
dividends only slightly higher than single taxation or by allowing only a small fraction of depreciation 
expenses to be tax deductible. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 3a:  Welfare and Output Losses and Long-Run Stability 
Double Taxation of  Dividends (y  = 2) 
With Depreciation Allowance (I$  = 1)  No Depreciation Allowance (I$  = 0) 
5  f Tk  'q,='ck='t  =h # =k  5=2,=2 
Welfare Loss 
AU /(A yIa 
baseline 
Output Loss  baseline  1.590 %  6.198  %  5.915 % 
AY IY 
Long-Run Stability  stable  stable  stable  stable 
aAU and Ay  are normalized using the steady-state values of X  and y from the baseline tax structure (y  = 2, I$  = 1, and 
2,  f 2,).  where 1  is the marginal utility of  private consumption (to convert AU  into consumption units) and  y is GNP. 
Table 3b:  Welfare and Output Losses and Long-Run Stability 
Single Taxation of  Dividends (W = 1) 





Long-Run Stability  unstable  stable  stable  stable 
Table 4:  Policy Options to Remove Long-Run Instability 
Policy Change to Tax Structure 
Impose Double Tax of  Impose Uniform Tax  Eliminate Depreciation 
Dividends  Structure  Allowance 
Change in  Welfare 
AU ~(AY)~ 
aAU and Ay  are normalized using the steady-state values of  h and y from the unstable tax structure (v  = 1, Q, = 1, and 
2,  # T,), where X  is the marginal utility of  private consumption (to convert AU  into consumption units) and  y is GNP. 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm6.  Concluding Remarks 
We have examined the welfare implications of some basic features of the U.S. tax code, namely, 
the double taxation of dividends, the tax deductibility of  depreciation, and the practice of taxing labor 
income differently from capital income. We find that all three of these features are desirable from the 
standpoint of maximizing the welfare of the representative household. Moreover, we find that movements 
away from this optimum tax structure can not only reduce economic welfare and output, but can also 
produce unstable dynamics in our model economy. While our model is admittedly a very abstract and 
simplified representation of the vastly complex U.S. tax code, we  believe that models of this type can 
be useful for examining key questions about the institutional structure of  our tax system. In our view, 
the strength of this model lies in its ability to capture the general-equilibrium effects of  endogenous 
fiscal policy. In our future research, we plan to address other features of the U.S. tax structure, such as 
the effects of  tax progressivity in an economy with heterogeneous agents. 
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